Speaker
Description
Adam Smith explores the dynamics– real and ideal – of human interaction. When people interact, they take on different social roles: they are agents, beneficiaries or victims of agents, or bystanders and spectators. Smith is famous for his account of spectators as moral judges. These judges rely on sympathy; their sympathy is directed towards people’s responsive sentiments.
Smith distinguishes between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ sympathy. The former is directed at the responsive sentiments of people affected by an agent’s action, the latter is directed at the agent whose action has affected other people.
Why does it make sense for a spectator to rely on sympathy when directing her or his attention to an agent? What does this move this reveal about Smith’s conception of rational agency? As I will argue, Smith sees human beings first and foremost as beings who are sensitive and vulnerable to what happens to them and especially to what other human beings do to them. While he does not deny that humans are rational agents, the essential human condition, according to him, is one of vulnerability. Humans share many vulnerabilities with non-humans. But underpinning Smith account of spectator sympathy is his recognition of moral vulnerability as the essential element of what it means to be human.
| Organization | University of Oslo, Norway |
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