Speaker
Description
This paper reassesses the controversially “narrow” (or “thin”) views of justice in David Hume and Adam Smith, evaluates their differences, and defends them against objections arising from contemporary concerns for social justice. Despite lingering textual polysemy, Hume infamously narrows justice down to the functional role of respecting property, promises, and contracts – let us call this the Propertarian Conception - while Smith broadens this to harmful actions, especially against person, property, and reputation. I suggest ways of reconciling their differences while sharpening their contributions. Hume and Smith offer compelling, mutually reinforcing reasons to think that “mere justice” should be conceived (at least in the beginning) narrowly, to account for the simple, negative, grammar-like rules of basic social coordination. I rely on contemporary complexity theory to show that the narrow demands of Humean and Smithean justice are well-suited to facilitate a realm of social coordination under the triple duress of social dynamism, diversity, and complexity. Importantly, accepting this insight is compatible with pluralistic efforts to expand the domain of social justice, as long as such expansions are carefully built on top of, or out of, the “mere justice” foundation. Thus, even proponents of social, distributive, or relational egalitarian justice who care about the “non-ideal” circumstances of social life (among whom I count myself) should incorporate robust concern for narrow justice into their overall package.
| Organization | New York University, School of Law, Classical Liberal Institute |
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