Speaker
Description
Hume, Wollstonecraft and Smith stand united in regarding modesty as a real virtue, one important for both the individual and society. They differ of course in the details. I present the details of the three accounts to find areas of agreement, and discuss the implications of the differences between them. My main aim will be to argue that combined, their views show us that modesty remains an important virtue, one worth championing, for precisely the main reason identified by these three thinkers: real modesty enhances our respect for others while preserving our sense of our own dignity. This view contrasts considerably with contemporary philosophical accounts of modesty.
Hume introduces modesty as a virtue whose basis lies in convention (along with other rules of good breeding), one we establish to offset the opposition of men’s pride and to facilitate sociability in conversation and other social interactions. While Hume argues that modesty may be little more than a “fair façade,” disguising the person’s sense of pride, I will argue here that enacting modest behavior cultivates our respect for others, and through a return of the esteem of others, enhances and renders more virtuous our sense of pride.
Wollstonecraft acknowledges the role of modesty in tamping down divisive displays of arrogance, but her main concern is to offer an argument to make a non-sexed modesty available to women to whom it is otherwise denied. Modesty requires the exercise of the intellect (in the liberal arts, politics, and good reasoning in general), and a sense of autonomy in cultivating a virtuous character. We find important ties between Wollstonecraft and Hume in distinguishing modesty from humility, which both regard as a vice; and in Wollstonecraft’s argument that modesty is not only compatible with but stands as the foundation of an acute consciousness of one’s own dignity. Interestingly, Wollstonecraft argues that modesty also entails regard for the sanctity of one’s body, a move designed to elevate the dignity of women’s status.
For Smith, the person who conforms his character and conduct to an ideal standard of exact propriety and perfection positions himself to become wise and virtuous. Because the ideal is not achievable, yet continues to provide a motive to virtue, his whole mind and conduct “is stamped with the character of real modesty.” Aligning his view to that of Hume and Wollstonecraft on the tie between modesty and respect, Smith argues that the modest person has a sense of and esteems the real merit of others. Smith situates his argument for modesty as a real virtue in the context of achieving the mean state of the principle of self-estimation, which can be too low or, more typically, too high. Smith agrees with Hume that excessive self-esteem undermines sociability. While he may seem to differ from Hume in regarding modesty as a consciously acquired virtue requiring the “slow, gradual and progressive work” of the internal demi-god or impartial spectator, I argue that Hume’s and Smith’s account of the influence of social mirroring on self-reflection brings their views closer together.
For all three philosophers, the virtue of modesty is an important achievement that can occur at a societal level as well as an individual one. In regarding the cultivation of modesty as an achievement, they point to the dangers of a society with stark divisions between the arrogant and entitled on the one hand, and the humiliated and scorned on the other. Wollstonecraft in particular reminds us that the persistence of social markers such as gender and race underscores an ever-present threat of extreme inequality. Together, Hume, Wollstonecraft and Smith show us that the cultivation of a genuine modesty enhances a shared sense of the dignity of humanity.
| Organization | University of San Francisco |
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