APRIL 29, 2025
Part I – Europe
Panel I. – European Citizenship, Identity and Values
Maaike Geuens
Title: Constitutional identity, democratic disconnect, EU institutions, Sovereignty, and Integration
Constitutional identity, as it is understood in this contribution, refers to the national constitutional principles that are distinct to each member state, often enshrined in constitutional texts and invoked by national courts. The EU has used a similar narrative when identifying its own constitutional order.
The term 'constitutional identity' may initially give the impression that the focus lies solely on the identity of the constitution itself. Nevertheless, there is a considerable conceptual journey to be undertaken before the full complexity of the concept can be fully grasped. It is essential to engage with the term 'constitutional identity' as a multidimensional and multifunctional topic. A constitution is not merely a legal document; rather, it is a foundational framework that governs the organization and functioning of a state. A constitution establishes the structure of government, delineates the distribution of powers, and, most crucially, enshrines fundamental rights and liberties. These sections concerning rights frequently constitute the essence of what renders a constitution a living document, one that reflects and adapts to the evolving values of society. Conversely, the term "identity" is more elusive and multifaceted. As various scholars have discussed, identity encompasses how individuals perceive themselves, both in terms of personal beliefs and their place within broader social or cultural contexts. When these terms are considered together, the concept of 'constitutional identity' extends beyond a mere technical analysis of legal provisions. It encompasses a deeper philosophical inquiry into how a constitution influences and reflects the values, norms, and self-understanding of a polity (section 1).
The EU has been confronted with a decline in trust of citizens as well as critiques aimed at the democratic functioning. This often leads to the conclusion that the EU at best suffers from a democratic disconnect. In the worst-case scenario, it suffers from a severe democratic deficit (section 2). Although many initiatives have been developed within the EU, the focus has mostly been on the institutional design of the EU. We aim to focus on the notion of constitutional identity and the way it could combat the disconnect between member states and the EU and even citizens and the EU.
By examining the constitutional identity of various member states the intersecting characteristics become clear and help construct a common narrative. Not all Member States of the EU will be covered. We discuss them where relevant to add balance to the discussion. We put forward that constitutional identity, when applied in a constructive and dialogical way, could allow for a more flexible and adaptive EU, where national values are respected without eroding the fundamental principles of integration. This would include the vision of member states and allow citizens to form one demos and a European sphere, albeit still in embryonic form (section 3). Our stance is however not without critique (section 4), which we aim to refute. We propose constitutional identity as a possible solution to democratic deficit and disconnect and offer views on reform to achieve this purpose (section 5).
Jean-Christophe Barbato
Title: Liberté académique et démocratie en droit de l’Union européenne.
L’article 13 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne prévoit que « les arts et la recherche scientifique sont libres. La liberté académique est respectée ». A compter du début des années 2000, les atteintes à la liberté académique se sont multipliées d’abord dans des étrangers proches, notamment en Turquie, puis à partir de la fin des années 2010 dans l’Union européenne. Confrontée à ces menaces inquiétantes envers ce qui constitue la « clé de voûte de l’héritage culturel académique en Europe » selon le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe, la Commission européenne a engagé un recours en manquement à l’encontre d’une loi hongroise de 2017 qui visait à obtenir la fermeture de l’Université d’Europe Centrale. Dans son arrêt du 6 octobre 2020, Commission c./ Hongrie, la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne met pour la première fois en œuvre l’article 13 CDF. Elle instaure également une conception ambitieuse de la liberté académique. Contrairement à la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’homme : elle intègre à cette liberté des aspects institutionnels et organisationnels. Cet arrêt constitue le premier pas dans l’intégration de la liberté académique au discursif axiologique de l’Union. Les institutions vont multiplier les affirmations associant cette liberté à la démocratie. Elles considèrent que la défense de la seconde implique le respect de la première. La mise en avant de ce lien joue tant au niveau interne que dans le cadre de l’action extérieure de l’Union. Il emporte un certain nombre de conséquences juridiques et politiques. Cette association entre liberté académique et démocratie repose sur l’idée que les paroles et les écrits universitaires occupent une place spécifique et irremplaçable dans le débat public. Face à la montée des vérités alternatives, des manipulations politiques et idéologiques permises par des technologies de masse, l’Université, la rigueur qui doit caractériser les travaux scientifiques, les exigences méthodologiques fortes qui les sous-tendent ainsi que la permanence du dialogue critique entre pairs sur la base de cette rigueur et de cette méthodologie sont autant de garanties procédurales d’une forme d’honnêteté intellectuelle, de qualité et de crédibilité de la parole et des écrits. Les travaux et paroles académiques participent à la préservation d’un discours rigoureux et d’un rapport sain à la vérité qui sont les corollaires indispensables d’une délibération publique éclairée et d’une démocratie qui fonctionne correctement. L’actualité états-unienne nous offre malheureusement un tragique exemple qui montre que le reflux de la démocratie implique des attaques
Ma contribution se propose de détailler le contenu de la liberté académique en droit de l’Union européenne et d’analyser le lien établi par les institutions dans leurs actes et leurs discours entre cette liberté et la démocratie.
Francesca Salvatore and Antonio Caso
Title: Public History as a Strategic Resource for European Citizenship, Identity, and Values
The European Union (EU) has long relied on legal frameworks and economic policies to shape a shared European identity and reinforce citizenship. However, in an era of increasing global challenges—including rising nationalism, historical revisionism, and digital misinformation—public history emerges as a crucial, yet underutilized, resource in fostering European values and identity. Public history, which engages wider audiences with the past through museums, digital platforms, heritage sites, and community initiatives, offers a dynamic and participatory approach to reinforcing European citizenship beyond legal and economic instruments.
The EU, as a unique transnational entity, requires more than economic interdependence and legal harmonization to cultivate a sense of belonging among its citizens. Public history provides a cultural and historical narrative that contextualizes European integration as an evolving, collective project. Unlike traditional academic history, public history is inherently interactive, shaping collective memory through public discourse, commemorations, and digital storytelling. It facilitates the construction of a pluralistic European identity by acknowledging diverse historical perspectives while highlighting shared experiences and common values such as democracy, human rights, and solidarity.
Moreover, public history has the potential to counter disinformation and historical distortions that threaten European cohesion. In recent years, historical revisionism and populist narratives have challenged the legitimacy of European integration by selectively interpreting the past. Public history initiatives—ranging from transnational exhibitions to digital archives and educational programs—can provide fact-based, accessible historical narratives that reinforce the EU’s foundational values. The European Parliament’s House of European History, for instance, exemplifies how institutions can use public history to foster critical engagement with Europe’s complex past and inspire a shared vision for the future.
Another key advantage of public history is its ability to engage citizens directly in the historical process. Unlike top-down approaches often associated with legal and economic policymaking, public history thrives on participation, dialogue, and community engagement. EU-sponsored initiatives such as the European Heritage Label and Erasmus+ history projects already demonstrate the potential of history-based cultural engagement to strengthen European identity. Expanding these efforts through digital storytelling, participatory archives, and community-led projects can further democratize the historical narrative, making European identity an inclusive and evolving construct.
In addition, public history offers a powerful tool for reconciliation and intercultural dialogue. Europe’s history is marked by conflicts, colonial legacies, and shifting borders, which continue to influence contemporary debates on migration, identity, and citizenship. A nuanced, inclusive historical narrative can facilitate cross-border understanding and foster a sense of European solidarity that transcends national histories. By funding and supporting collaborative history projects, the EU can promote a transnational memory culture that acknowledges past divisions while reinforcing common values.
Finally, public history is particularly well-suited to the digital age. Social media, virtual reality, and online archives provide unprecedented opportunities to make history accessible and engaging for diverse audiences. Digital platforms enable citizens from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds to interact with shared European narratives, thereby reinforcing the EU’s cultural and civic foundations in an increasingly interconnected world.
In conclusion, while law and economics remain essential pillars of European integration, public history offers a complementary and indispensable resource for fostering European citizenship, identity, and values. By investing in participatory, inclusive, and transnational historical initiatives, the EU can strengthen its cultural foundations and build a more cohesive and resilient European community in the face of global challenges.
Bledar Kurti
Title: Today’s challenges of European Citizenship, Identity and Values
During the last decade the European Union has tremendously invested and laid a clear platform on defining what is European citizenship, identity and values. It initiated expansion approach of the EU membership, by accepting the integration of Eastern European countries, yet experiencing expansion fatigue due to the rise of immigration level and the political unrest from candidate and aspiring countries, as well as internal political agendas and changes in the governments in certain EU member countries.
During the last decade, Covid-19 pandemics, Brexit, the stances of Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and some other member countries disrupted the clear vision and what seemed to be a well and wide accepted definition of European citizenship, identity and values. The dynamics within the EU countries have not edified but disrupted the continuity of the progress in determining once and for all what the European identity is.
The war in Ukraine and the recent position of the new Administration of the United States have further disrupted the harmony between the EU countries on the shared valued and new challenges have risen for all the EU members, candidates and aspiring countries.
In my presentation I will present the challenges that EU and all European countries face today in relation to the continuation or renewal of the definition, concept and principle of European citizenship, identity and values.
Fabienne Péraldi Leneuf
Title: The independence of the judiciary as an aspect of respect for the rule of law: exporting the european model
Traditionally, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary have been included among the fundamental human rights guaranteed at national, European and international level, intended to safeguard the rights to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, and thus in turn to guarantee the principles of freedom, equality and personal integrity. Within the framework of the Council of Europe and the European Union, they complement the many substantial elements that characterise ‘a democratic society’.
For some years now, however, these principles have been mobilised in a new context of debate, no longer simply in support of a substantive approach, but in support of the defence of the European model of the rule of law, which prefigures an institutionalised approach to Democracy. The case referred to relates to the evolution of certain political regimes within the EU that have drifted or are drifting towards illiberalism (Poland and Hungary). The Court of Justice of the EU has managed to make this shift by relying on Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Article 19.2 of the TFEU and Article 2 TEU. It has thus established a close link with the values of the EU as a European model, with the rule of law also incorporating the principles of legality, legal certainty, combating abuse of the law, equality and non-discrimination, constitutional justice and therefore separation of powers.
Preserving this model and exporting it are major challenges for the EU today. Preventive and curative tools have been put in place internally: the annual EU Justice Scoreboard, which since 2013 has provided comparable data on the independence, quality and effectiveness of national judicial systems; the European Rule of Law Mechanism, which, based on the Annual Rule of Law Report, has since 2020 provided a qualitative assessment of significant developments in the fields of justice, the fight against corruption, media independence and the institutional balance of power in each Member State, as well as specific recommendations to all Member States to prevent the emergence or worsening of challenges to the rule of law. The case law of the two European courts continues to support this vision.
However, we need to go even further, for example by strengthening judicial cooperation between the Member States, developing a new ‘European judicial policy’, highlighting the inalienability of these principles for Europe and the rest of the world, sharing good practice with the candidate countries, and multiplying educational initiatives targeting civil society and citizens so that they themselves become the promoters of these principles.
A Justice Fund should be set up to support the proper administration of justice and enable it to be accountable throughout Europe, independent of political upheaval.
Esra Akgemci
Title: Rethinking the EU’s Role in Promoting Peace, Human Rights, and Democracy Amid Anti-Gender Politics and Right-Wing Populism
Gender equality and human rights are fundamental to European values and are priorities embedded in all EU policies. In 2018, the EU Council urged its member states to fully implement the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, encompassing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. Adopted in 2000, this resolution was the first to explicitly acknowledge the impact of war on women and highlight the importance of women’s contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. The comprehensive integration of this resolution into all EU efforts to promote sustainable peace, security, human rights, justice, and development has encouraged the inclusion of gender perspectives across EU policies. UNSCR 1325 was also a groundbreaking and foundational element of feminist foreign policy (FFP), first adopted in Sweden in 2014.FFP extends beyond the traditional notions of state security and places human security at the heart of foreign relations, aiming to foster a sustainable and peaceful future. The Swedish model is vital for countries pursuing a similar path, such as Canada, Spain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Mexico. However, in 2022, Sweden’s new conservative government retreated from this policy, asserting that the “feminist” label could be counterproductive. This withdrawal in the birthplace of FFP is striking, revealing the extent of ultra-conservative mobilization against the feminist struggle today. Feminists have historically faced resistance when taking strategic steps toward gender justice and equality. Today, the rise of right-wing populism has strengthened anti-feminist movements across various regions, undermining institutional, legal, and political advancements aimed at combating gender-based violence. The anti-gender movements and campaigns that have emerged in the past decade, particularly in Europe, should not merely be viewed as a continuation of the anti-feminist backlash from the 1970s, but rather as part of a new political configuration. Indeed, opposition to “gender ideology” has become a crucial component of the rise in right-wing populism. This paper aims to connect political trends with foreign policy and explore how FFP can function to combat the anti-gender agenda that has emerged as a significant element of right-wing populism. The paper contends that EU gender equality policies should be restructured in light of anti-gender politics and right-wing populism, leveraging the lessons learned from a decade of FFP experiences for this restructuring. Such policies should be based on three primary elements: (1) Recognizing the anti-gender movement as a global threat to human security, especially for women and LGBTI individuals, and prioritizing efforts to combat this threat; (2) Supporting social movements, particularly those of women and LGBTI individuals, while creating avenues for their participation in foreign policy decision-making; (3) Adopting an intersectional approach to peacebuilding that addresses all forms of injustice and inequality by considering how gender intersects with other forms of inequality. The EU has played a crucial role in shaping gender equality policies, guiding member states, influencing its organizational structure, and operating internationally. However, unless it harnesses this institutional power to establish inclusive and effective mechanisms to counter anti-gender movements, progress will fall short of expectations.
Sara Poli
Title: Citizenship by Investment Programs: Constraints and Conditions Imposed by Treaty provisions on the European Citizenship and on CFSP
The presentation discusses the constraints placed by EU law on Member States’ decisions to grant citizenship. Under EU primary law, European citizenship is an additional or accessory to national citizenship; the competence to determine who is a citizen of a Member State indisputably belongs to the national legislator. However, the latter must respect the citizenship rules of other Member States, as ruled by the Court of Justice's ruling in its ruling in Micheletti.1 Moreover, since the granting of citizenship has consequences not only within the Member State of naturalization but also for all other EU members, due to the rights stemming from the European citizenship, the Member State awarding the citizenship does not enjoy complete freedom in making its decision. These issues are raised by an infringement procedure introduced by the Commission against Malta,2 which will be decided by the Court on April 29, 2025. The proceedings concern specific rules on citizenship: the "CPI Programs" or golden passports. The 2020 Maltese regulation on granting citizenship for exceptional services of 2020 allows foreign citizens to apply for naturalization in exchange for investments; other conditions, including acquiring legal residence in Malta are also provided for by the concerned legislation. CPI programs grant citizenship without an effective link between the foreign citizen and the state granting citizenship. According to the Commission, the legislation concerned breaches Article 20(1) TFEU and the principle of loyal cooperation, under Article 4(3) TEU. AG Collins has proposed rejecting the appeal. 3
The presentation argues that the EU cannot impose on Member States to require that a person applying for naturalization must show an effective link with the country granting citizenship. Indeed, a foreign citizen applying for naturalization in a Member State has not yet acquired a right which is protected under EU law. This is different from the case where a citizen of a Member State is deprived of his/her nationality and automatically loses his/her European citizenship. In this case, the Court of Justice has imposed a series of constraints on the Member State intending to revoke citizenship precisely because of the loss of national citizenship causes the loss of European citizenship. Additionally, it is uncertain whether it would be possible to invoke the doctrine of abuse of EU law against Malta to that this country has breached EU law. Yet, this does not mean that Member States are free from EU law constraints in granting citizenship. Malta itself, in its defense submissions in the case at hand, argues that in some circumstances, EU law limits a Member State's power to grant national citizenship. The thesis supported by the presentation is that in case a foreign citizen is subject to EU restrictive measures, adopted under Article 29 TEU and 215 TFEU, the Member State to which such a person applies for citizenship is obliged to refrain from granting it, due to obligations arising from CFSP provisions, TFEU (Article 215 TFEU), and the principle of loyal cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU.
Panel II- The European Union in a Changing World
Ana Bojinović Fenko, Julija Brsakoska Bazerkoska
Title: EUROPEAN UNION’S CONTRIBUTIONS IN ADRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER: ANALYSIS OF EU’S ACTORNESS IN THE FIELDS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TRADE
This article will analyze the implications for the EU’s global actorness stemming from the changes in the world order since 2020. Grounded in Hettne’s (2005) three-dimensional conceptualization of the world order, namely its structure, mode of governance and form of legitimization, we contribute to an empirical analysis of EU’s actorness in the emerging multipolar, pluri-lateral and regional-hegemony-legitimized world order. The research question is, how is the EU contributing to addressing challenges in the changing world order via its actorness (Bretherton and Vogler, 2005; Wunderlich and Bailey, 2011). The empirical analysis will focus on three currently most pressing issues on the international agenda where the EU holds a diverse actorness capability. First, the international conflict resolution, where the European Union has supporting competences within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, has faced diverse results in addressing Russian war in Ukraine and the Israeli offensive in Gaza and Lebanon after the Hamas attacks. Second, the paper will examine the EU’s actorness on the issues of digital sovereignty and the AI development, which can be examined under the external dimension of its common market policy and human rights promotion, where the EU has shared competences with the Member States. Finally, the paper will assess the issues connected with open international trade, where under the external dimension of the common commercial policy the EU has exclusive competences. The EU’s normative contributions and actions in these three contemporary challenges in international field will be examined via legal and content analysis of primary and secondary sources of EU’s origin and from relevant international setting (regimes, organizations).
Ingrid Kiessling R.
Title: The Strategic Alliance between the European Union and Latin America: Protection of Democracy and Human Rights in the Context of Global Instability
The first distinction that emerges when considering Europe's current role in the protection and promotion of global peace, democracy, and the rule of law stems from its legal tradition, rooted in respect for International Law. In contemporary discourse, the concept of the rule of law, particularly in relation to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, is often invoked by certain nations as a justification for disregarding the rights of peoples as enshrined in international treaties, including those addressing human rights.
In the current geopolitical landscape, regional organizations responsible for promoting democracy, human rights, security, and development are of paramount importance for the coordination and direction of international affairs. An example of such an organization is the Organization of American States (OAS), in which the European Union holds the status of Permanent Observer. Within these organizations, some state leaders have challenged these principles, pursuing national agendas that undermine their international obligations. Since August 2024, Chile has assumed the presidency of the Voluntary Group for Monitoring the Inter-American Democratic Charter, an instrument designed to strengthen the democratic institutions of the countries in the Americas. Against this backdrop, an analysis is presented of the European Union's role in promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in other regions, with particular emphasis on Latin America. This examination includes a critique of the resurgence of authoritarian leaderships that pose a threat to the principles of international law recognized by the international community, signaling a potential precursor to international instability and threats to global peace. This analysis will be framed within the context of the proposal put forth in light of Resolution AG/RES. 3004 (LIII-O/23) on the Strengthening of Democracy, underscoring the significance of the strategic alliance between the European Union and Latin America as key promoters of a just, sustainable, and human rights-based international order.
Eirikur Bergmann
Title: Europe’s Security Architecture in an Age of Transactional Diplomacy
Donald Trump's re-election in 2024 marks a watershed moment for Europe’s security architecture. With his administration openly questioning NATO’s Article 5 commitments and retreating from the postwar transatlantic order, European states face unprecedented strategic dilemmas in the modern era. As the United States abandons multilateralism and turns inward under the sway of nationalist populism, Europe must confront the reality of strategic autonomy without the guarantee of America coming to its defense.
This paper explores the geopolitical and ideological consequences of Trump’s second term for European security, drawing on my extensive research on nationalist populism (see Bergmann, 2018, 2020, 2024). Trump’s foreign policy aligns with a broader global trend in which nationalist leaders undermine multilateralism, challenge supranational institutions, and prioritise transactional diplomacy over alliances. The resurgence of such politics in the United States, echoing parallel movements in Europe, exacerbates existing fissures within the EU and NATO, emboldening illiberal forces and undermining collective defense structures.
As Europe recalibrates its security strategy, it must navigate two competing imperatives: the need for greater self-reliance in defense and the preservation of a values-based international order. This paper will assess the EU’s evolving response, including efforts to enhance its military capabilities, deepen defense integration, and develop alternative security partnerships. However, these shifts occur amid growing internal fragmentation, with nationalist-populist forces in the EU resisting deeper supranational cooperation.
This contribution situates these challenges within the broader context of democratic resilience and supranational governance. It contends that Europe’s best course lies in reaffirming its commitment to multilateralism, democratic values, and collective security mechanisms. In doing so, the EU can function as a “laboratory” for democratic solutions to security dilemmas in an era of rising authoritarianism and strategic uncertainty.
This paper analyses Europe’s security future after America’s retreat based on my previous studies of nationalist populism. It concludes with policy recommendations on how the EU can reinforce its role as a geopolitical actor while safeguarding democratic norms against the forces of fragmentation and authoritarian resurgence.
Mohamed Shokry
Title: The European Union’s migration governance as a laboratory in a changing world
The European Union’s migration governance has become a laboratory in a changing world, where European citizenship values are not only promoted but also put into practice in response to the modern challenges of migration. Irregular migration from North Africa, and the case of Egyptian migrants to Italy, who are among the top arrivals on the Central Mediterranean route, shows the multifaceted interrelationship between the EU policies, national strategies and legal frameworks. Over the past two decades, the EU has established external border controls and asylum policies to regulate migration flows in order to guarantee the functioning of the Schengen area and the legitimacy of its institutions. The New Pact on Migration and Asylum (2020) builds on this approach by enhancing migration management tools and cooperation with external partners to ensure responsibility sharing.
The EU has a dual strategy of enhancing border management (including Frontex operations supporting national coast guards) as well as signing bilateral agreements with origin and transit countries. Egypt has been an important member of this strategy, collaborating with the EU in migration control and readmission since the mid-2000s. The new EU-Egypt partnership has significantly enhanced the EU's support for border management and refugee programs in order to prevent departures. Despite the effectiveness of these efforts in reducing migration flows, there are concerns about human rights accountability, such as the restrictions on migrants' access to asylum and protection. At the national level, Italy, as the primary destination of Egyptian migrants within the EU, has enforced more stringent immigration laws, including the 2002 Bossi-Fini law, to prevent irregular entries and has put into place bilateral measures. The 2007 Italy-Egypt repatriation agreement enables rapid deportations with the help of the EU. Nevertheless, there are still many Egyptians in Italy who are undocumented and are engaged in agricultural and construction work where labour is in high demand. The periodic amnesty programmes also show the gap between the restrictive policies and the economic realities. These contradictions shed light on a moral economy of migration governance where the public desire for control is simultaneous with economic dependence and humanitarian concerns that advocate for inclusion.
This dynamic was witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the demand to regularise migrant farmworkers rose from public health and humanitarian perspectives, indicating a movement toward moral rationales in migration policy making. However, legal boundaries affect the governance. A member state of the European Union must respect fundamental rights in the exercise of its migration control. The Hirsi v Italy case (2012), in which the European Court of Human Rights convicted Italy of turning back migrants, consolidated the non-refoulement legal standard and the need for legal protections.
This case highlights the importance of coordinated EU-wide migration governance of root causes, legal pathways, and human dignity while meeting security and economic needs. Egyptian migration is a crucial test case for the EU's role as a supranational actor in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, balancing border security with human rights obligations.
Oleksiy Kandyuk
Title: Transatlantic Shift, Strategic Autonomy and Ukraine
The shifting transatlantic dynamics, driven by the Trump administration’s return, have created significant challenges for the European Union and Ukraine. With growing uncertainty over the U.S. commitment to NATO and European security, the EU faces the urgent need to transition from strategic dependence to autonomy. Trump's rhetoric on potential NATO withdrawal, demands for increased European defense spending, and a transactional approach to alliances have weakened the traditional transatlantic order, forcing the EU to reconsider its geopolitical strategy.
The European security landscape is undergoing a profound transformation. The traditional reliance on the U.S. as the primary security guarantor is no longer sustainable, as evident in Washington’s shifting priorities. Trump's approach toward Ukraine, including waning support and calls for territorial concessions, has further underscored the need for Europe to take on a more proactive role in regional security. For Ukraine, this shift presents both risks and opportunities—while U.S. backing becomes more uncertain, the EU’s role as a primary partner and security provider grows in importance.
The EU’s strategic autonomy, once a theoretical concept, is now an urgent necessity. The erosion of the transatlantic order, economic pressures, and internal divisions pose serious obstacles, yet they also open pathways for stronger European unity. Economic shortfalls compared to the U.S. and China, particularly in technological and industrial sectors, further complicate the EU’s position. Internal fragmentation, fueled by nationalist movements and illiberal governance in some member states, hinders a unified European approach to foreign and security policy. Overcoming these divisions is essential for the EU to establish itself as an independent geopolitical player.
The EU’s response to these geopolitical shifts will define its future global standing. Strategic autonomy is no longer an option but a necessity for preserving European influence and security. The success of this transition hinges on overcoming internal divisions, mobilizing resources, and demonstrating leadership. For Ukraine, deeper integration with the EU offers a pathway to stability and resilience, reinforcing the broader goal of a stronger, more autonomous Europe.
Catherine Vieilledent
Title: The Role of the EU in a Post Multilateral World
In the current age of strained multilateralism, the European Union as often recognized champion of multilateralism, has entered a phase where its values (from rule of law, human rights to social and environmental standards) are hard hit by geopolitical tensions. The breakdown of the Doha Round in 2016, failing to complete multilateral trade liberalisation, was a first signal. It was followed by rising tensions between the “Global North” (developed countries) and those of the “Global South” (emerging powers such as Brazil, South Africa, India) that ushered in an era of distrust in the international system. The Russian invasion of Ukraine put an abrupt end to the vision of trade with authoritarian regimes in an effort to induce political change (“Wandel durch Handel”, "Change through trade"). In addition, the EU finds itself now isolated and deprived of the support of its traditional transatlantic ally. The EU today must find a course of action between a benign neglect of values (the pragmatic line) and the insistence on the effective compliance with liberal values by its external partners (the principled stance). The dilemma is very pressing, with the near prospect of enlargement, and Europeans today must act on three fronts in a differentiated manner: internally, towards authoritarian backsliding under the thrust of populist forces, who openly defy European unity; towards the candidate countries where the Union has a very strong hand; towards third countries with mediocre results either in the neighbourhood (Serbia, Turkey) or in its relations with non-democratic countries (Russia, China, oil monarchies…) where it suffers from various dependencies (energy) and is submitted to migratory blackmail. The article looks into the solutions available to address these unprecedented challenges. Ursula von der Leyen’s “geopolitical Commission” was an early response but the EU must urgently agree on the common interests it is determined to defend. Its determination in upholding the values of rule of law and multilateralism may signal a convincing posture on how to address democratic regression inside and in its external action as well. However, this stance may involve a willingness to accept the language of force (ReArmEU) in proportion to the perils for its security. Though it never aspired to be an imperial power, the EU must unite to build a common defense and bear the burden of the wasted dividends of peace. Consistency in its commitment to a rules-based international system must go hand in hand with a staunch will to unite against aggression, a capacity to advance on a shared foreign policy, and with a flexible search for allies. The challenges to European unity in the regional and global environment have never been so high as today.
KEYNOTE SPEECH
Maria D’Aprile & Co
Title: UNGSC as a lab of the UN 2.0
In line with UNGSC practice of partnership with Uni Salento and given the importance to raise awareness on the rule of law and values, the UNGSC is interested in engaging to see how best to meet the expectations for the discussion.
The United Nations, as a cornerstone of multilateralism, has reaffirmed its commitment to a renewed set of core values: Integrity, Inclusion, Humility, and Humanity. These principles not only guide the organization's internal culture but also serve as a moral compass for global governance, fostering cooperation, resilience, and sustainable solutions.
With its more than 30 years of history, about a thousand staff of more than 50 nationalities and diverse profiles, and with its constant exposure to global challenges - while well anchored and integrated in the host country - the UN Global Service Centre is a living lab for the development of the organization’s new culture.
Representatives of UNGSC will share insights and best practices on how we contribute to these values through the services we deliver, especially in the face of global challenges and inequalities.
APRIL 30, 2025
Part II – World
Panel III. – Values and Tools for a New World Order
Jeffrey Glausiusz
Title: Time to Rebuild
We are living in historic times. Times with considerable dangers and upheavals. These are exactly the times when it is feasible to envision a process of rebuilding. For in more stable epochs proposing and implementing substantial change would not be realistic. Thoughtful people have over the ages proposed better way to manage global affairs. I mention in this respect especially Immanual Kant in his essay Perpetual Peace and Emery Reeves in his book “The anatomy of Peace”.
Their ideas have had some influence, however current Global Institutions are still a long way
from the models proposed by them.
It is my intention to reexamine their ideas and propose how they could be updated and
made more relevant to our current situation.
Our world is exposed to extreme dangers which are currently not being satisfactorily dealt
with. These dangers include, but are not limited to, Climate Change and environmental
degradation, nuclear proliferation and brinkmanship and irresponsible implementations of
artificial Intelligence.
The root cause of all of these problems is that technology has advanced and is advancing. However, our political institutions are not advancing at the same pace if at all. Similarly, our legal and ethical systems are not being updated to reflect current needs.
Democracies within individual States are also facing difficulties which are exacerbated by
unregulated technologies. The obvious example of this the spread of misinformation via
unregulated or insufficiently regulated social media.
Many of the challenges the world faces are global in nature. These include as above climate change etc. However, our decision making ability is almost entirely at the national level with some powers conferred on regional bodies such as the European Union. Unfortunately, individual States and even regional bodies are largely impotent when it comes to dealing with global problems especially when these involve complexities.
That being said, the European Union is a step in the right direction. It has been proven to be more effective on environmental and regulatory matters than the great majority of individual states. So , in proposing change on the global level it is highly relevant to investigate which elements of the EU are scalable to the global level and which are not.
Trying to deal piecemeal with all of the above myriad issues is unlikely to be sufficient and we do not have time for that. Hence the proposition in this paper to reexamine the best alternative models as above and rework them in light of our current situation. In short it is my intention to propose, in broad strokes, how humanity can and should update our political structures and legal and ethical systems. For that, the experience of the European Union is also highly relevant.
With the correct key a lock will open with ease. Without the correct key, time will be wasted and efforts will be futile.
In summary, I will elaborate on the above and explain why current political institutions are incapable of solving global issues. This incapability is directly leading to the current global instability. Restoration of global stability and productivity will require new thinking and implementation. I propose here how this should be done.
Brian T. Schmitt
Title: Democracy as a Set of Normative Social Relationships: The IAPD Framework
This paper addresses a major stumbling block in the democracy debates, the question of power. Despite widespread belief that power is at the heart of society, there is little agreement on what power is. Anglophone scholars have tended to limit the scope of power to particular areas and specific situations.
Power happens when there is a winner and a loser. In contrast, continental observers, Machiavelli,
Foucault, Bourdieu and others, have tended to see power everywhere, a gravitational field from which escape is impossible.
If power is understood in the limited sense of “power over,” it is a zero-sum game. Addressing power- imbalances then means taking it away from one group and giving it to another. On the other hand, if power is everywhere, how does one escape from it, diffuse it, fight it? From an analytical and a normative perspective, both of these approaches are problematic. If our goal is to assign power to its proper place in a well functioning democracy, we need a working definition, not just of power, but also of influence, authority, and even domination.
Part 1 introduces the Influence, Authority, Power, and, Domination framework (the “IAPD framework”). This framework takes social relationships, in their ideal-types (Weber (2019)), as the organizing principle around which democracy-in-practice can be operationalized. Synthesizing work from political science and sociology, it posits six properties inherent in all social relationships: (1) identity, the notion of in-group/out-group and membership (Plato’s The Republic, Popper (1945, 1947)); (2) scope, the where, when, and what of the relationship (Dahl 1987); (3) intensity, the depth of feeling (Mann (1986)); (4) possibility, with its three elements rights, options, and choice (Hirschman (1970)), Frankl (1984), Eger (2018)); (5) sanction, the extent to which punishment, clemency, deprivation, and reward are considered normal aspects of the relationship (Lasswell & Kaplan (1950)); and (6) well-being, the objective interests and subjective values of the participants in the relationship (Gaventa (1986), Nyman & Nilsén (2016), Wilkinson & Pickett (2019), Sen (2000)). Based on these properties, conceptually valid and reliable definitions of the four social relationships are established.
Part 2 presents how the IAPD framework creates guidelines for assessing and correcting democratic practices. With clear definitions of influence, authority, power, and domination we can begin to collectively answer such questions as: Is power really everywhere? Or is it sometimes influence that has been poorly-specified? To what extent are actual power relationships socially acceptable and why? Where they are not, how can we diffuse them in a rational and ethical way? What is the difference between “corporate influence” and “corporate power” and what does that mean for strategies to limit each of them? Are regulatory authorities actually executing authority if they fail to promote the public well-being? What do we mean when we chant ‘Power to the people!’? Is it accurate to talk about ‘domination’ in the emerging post-Enlightenment (Gray 2002), platform society and, if so, why? Getting the right answers to these questions is not just an academic exercise. A deeper, shared understanding of influence, authority, power, and domination and their appropriate places in society can help to promote social solidarity and improve democratic practices. More broadly, robust definitions of social relationships are integral to discussions of citizenship, identity, values, interdependence, strategic autonomy, and human rights.
Wolfgang Pape
Title: Interpopularity Beyond National Borders
“We the peoples …” read the historic first words of the UN Charter. However, the United Nations is not literally “interpopular”, but legally purely international. The “people” (Latin populus,) find formal representation in the UN only indirectly and through political recognition as “nations” by the other “nations”, already members in this closed club of the “Westphalian System”. Ironically, it was the drawing of borders in faraway South-East Asia by Europeans already early in the 17th century that conflicts between these colonisers had led to “international law” ruling the claims for maritime access against the rights of colonial settlements on land. Not only for numerous wars between nations (literally “inter-national”) but also waves of globalisation by peaceful people(s) reaching and even moving beyond borders the term “international” was hitherto used indiscriminately. Here, these people-to-people i.e. interpopular relations strictly ought to be distinguished from those between nations, i.e. truly international relations; as well as private law differs from public law.
Among Asians, historically the notion of the “nation” with fought-over fixed territorial borders for “natives” has no history like in Europe, most evident is the central case of China, the origin of the long-lasting ‘Middle Kingdom’ (i.e. 中国still nowadays in its own and Japanese naming). Their pattern of thinking about the state has long been less as a comprehensive area-wide institution with fixed borders for those native on that territory to call it a “nation” in the European sense of this hackneyed term. The Chinese mandarinates of the past and present would not imagine China as only a “nation” in hard rivalry with neighbouring nations like in Europe until WWII, but rather rely on the radiation of soft power from its centre over the others, e.g. now interpopularily spreading their Global Civilisation Initiative.
Luca Belgiorno-Nettis
Title: An Antidote to Identity Politics and Nationalistic Rhetoric
Conflict arising out of social cleavages is a recurrent theme in human history, with political ideology a more recent force in driving people apart. We tend to create groups that have an inclusive and exclusive dimension – an ingroup and an outgroup – and a significant part of our identity is connected to membership of our group.
As President Trump spouts MAGA – Make America Great Again and paralyses the World Trade Organisation by introducing self-serving tariffs – China, for its part, ignores the judicial determinations of The Hague concerning the South China Sea. President Xi believes what is needed is “discipline, unity and greater adherence to ideology”.
The world’s two most powerful leaders are facing each other off with ominous portends. Supranational decision-making must factor in domestic patriotic bombast as the real challenge. Global co-operation starts with developing better structures for dialogue at the local level.
Representative deliberative processes have grown to become a new trusted mechanism for public authorities to engage citizens and enhance the quality of public decisions. In 2019, the European Commission launched the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFE) which demonstrated how Europe is trying to re-connect directly with its constituents; and this experience might encourage the UN to also refresh its mandate – with the people of the world.
“Defence spending is arguably the worst conceivable waste of money” said Laszlo Sombatfalvy, the Founder of The Global Challenges Foundation. “It doesn’t even consider all the human suffering caused by the killing, the wounding and the refugee streams”.
This essay proposes that, through a Global Citizens’ Assembly process, the UN might be more empowered to broker international agreements around a global challenge, ie; Disarmament. Using the experience of CoFE as a template, in-country National Panels would then feed into global Plenaries.
Here is a group of everyday people coming together to deliberate on a global challenge. These citizens have no incentive to disagree; they have no campaign to run and no domestic political agenda to satisfy; and they don’t care about having to get re-elected or re-appointed – whether in electoral or consultative democracies. What’s proposed here is an antidote to nationalist rhetoric and identity politics.
INSPIRATIONAL TALK
Joe Weston
Title: Fierce civility – A practical pathway to transformational governance
Has the world gone mad? We seem polarized to the point of extremism and caught in a perpetual cycle of anxiety. Most of us know things must change and that we need to find our way back to one another. So, where do we begin, and what guideposts can help us navigate from fear to hope?
When the entire world was on the brink of nuclear war in 1960, with two superpowers polarized against each other, Eleanor Roosevelt spoke these prescient words: “We have to face the fact that either all of us are going to die together, or we are going to learn to live together; and if we are to live together, we have to talk.”
Today, Roosevelt’s words remain chilling—and perhaps more relevant than ever. While she paints a dire picture, she also offers a clear, simple, and powerful solution. Here’s my summation:
• First, no one is exempt from both the responsibility and the consequences of determining what our shared future will look like.
• Second, working together is essential. But working only with people who already agree with us isn’t bringing about the change we hope for. Finding new alliances in surprising places is the only viable path to a future that still holds hope.
• Third, the willingness to talk with one another in ways that overcome differences must underlie and enable collaboration, leading to better and broader solutions.
• Fourth, how we’re currently communicating isn’t working. We need a new, upgraded way to talk and engage that meets the demands of our present challenges.
Revising constitutions, rewriting laws, and advocating for policies that prioritize the well-being of people and the planet are essential for our emergence into a more peaceful and equitable future. However, new laws have little power if there’s no effort to slowly and compassionately invite people into a process of transforming their viewpoints, habits, and patterns. Without this, laws remain abstract concepts on paper—and may even contribute to further polarization, harm, and destruction.
Fierce Civility: Transforming Our Global Culture from Polarization to Lasting Peace addresses these issues and more by providing a step-by-step pathway into a dynamic new human story with hope at its foundation. It lays out the Fierce Civility Pathway of Hope: a sweeping, bold, yet highly relational and pragmatic plan that can break the gridlock of polarization, bring us together, and get us talking again to form effective solutions to our personal and global challenges.
Through strategies, skills, and practices honed and road-tested over decades, Fierce Civility takes us on a journey of engaging the heart and its attributes of wisdom, compassion, and courage in practical, concrete ways—bringing about healing, reconciliation, and both personal and cultural transformation. Its powerful message is for anyone trying to find their grounding in these uncertain times or seeking a practical, heart-inspired methodology for making world peace, at long last, our reality.
PANEL IV- A World in Transition
Sergio Barbosa Dos Santos Silva
Title: On the rise of AI literacies
AI can be defined as a system’s ability to interpret data, to build learning models from such
data, and subsequently use these models to achieve specific objectives, incorporating flexible adaptation. The arrival of generative AI technologies for text, images, and music, like ChatGPT, Dall- E, Midjourney and many others have raised a number of debates by Western scholars. Elliot (2019) postulates “AI and its related offshoot machine learning, as encompassing any computational system that can sense its relevant context and react intelligently to data” (2019, p. 4). Coeckelbergh (2020) states that “AI is already happening today, and it is pervasive, often invisibly embedded in our day-to-day tools” (2020, p. 4), while Lindgren (2024) writes that “AI is positioned in a network of humans, politics, economy, culture, meaning making and power” (2024, p. 4). As a consequence, AI literacy is now ready to be recognized as a human and (digital) right, and its field is growing, challenging and diverse. AI literacy can be broadly defined as the development of knowledge, skills, and attitudes to provide an essential framework for critical lifelong engagement with AI generative technologies. It is also an essential framework to define, teach and evaluate AI technologies (Kitng et al., 2021). It has settled as a paramount component of public debate today. AI literacies can flatten the richness, plurality, and diversity of data cultures, infrastructures, “everyday data literacies” (Burgess et al., 2022) and “critical data literacies” (Sander, 2023) practices that emerge on the margins, privileging engagement with AI that promotes critical pedagogy beyond the narrow, one-dimensional views of the world (Rojas, 2016). In doing so, this article instead seeks ways of pluriversal worlds “where many worlds fit” (Escobar, 2018, p. 6). In addition, research has aimed to nurture future generations through AI regulation via parliaments and the state level (legislation before education). However, little research has focused on developing pedagogical initiatives through co-creation and from a pedagogical participatory approach which focuses on agencying young people to play a multi-disciplinary role for social change. The article fosters an educational approach to build solid post digital futures (education before legislation). It constitutes a theoretical framework to bring AI pedagogy to the forefront of policymaking in EU. To do so, it contributes to the literature in order to investigate the so-called AI Literacy Sessions (AILS) to empower and nurture young people in the era of AI generative technologies. It will suggest policy recommendations to reflect on how young people can be active promoters of social interventions and embrace their own concept of post digital futures. At the same time, it argues urgently to fight dis/misinformation, hate speech, the escalation of a far-right agenda, and conspiracy theories, while promoting an educational long-term agenda principles by public values rather than logics for profit supported by big tech companies such as GAMAM (Goggle, Amazon, Meta, Apple, Microsoft) which are most of the times responsible for the creation, implementation and manutention of AI generative technologies. To conclude, the article
will suggest the growing influence on public policies to build a more resistant digital transition.
Troy Davis
Title: The Schuman method applied to global climate change
One might describe the « Schuman method » as the genesis and cornerstone of european and EU politics. But many people forget that this method, creating new innovative institutions, sui generis, was actually rooted in the desire NOT to get rid of war in Europe, but all over the world ! Making peace in Europe was just the start, the exemple, the precedent, and the proof of concept, that it actually could be done. As the seminal speech of Schuman of 9 May 1950 proves, by starting with the term of « world peace » and not « european peace », the goal of european peace, through step by step european integration, was to serve as a stepping stone to world peace. We forget to our peril that the founders had not just experienced a world war, but two world wars ! One as teenagers and one as grown men. They decided after WWII not to repeat the mistakes made after WWI, namely the punitive nature of the Versailles Treaty, and the lack of european institutions designed to make war impossible.
The first such institution was the European Coal and Steel Community, which led to the EU we know today. Curiously, few if any people know that the European Parliament is literally the same assembly set up for the ECSC. This fact is crucial for our interest in providing democratic oversight to global climate change management. The idea is to create a World Carbon Community, inspired by the ECSC, with similar institutions, tasked with the technical aspects of implementing COP decisions. This would solve a fundamental problem, the lack of adequate follow-up to COP political decisions, which is strange since nearly all successful international treaties of any significance come with an institution designed to help its members implement the treaty or political agreements. This would resolve thte constant problem of decision pile-up by the COPs, whereby decisions cannot be made because previous decisions have not yet been implemented. The WCC would serve as the technical secretariat for the world community and help to implement the needed policies for the decarbonation of the world economy. And like the ESCS, it would have something akin to a high authority, a parliamentary assembly, and some sort of court, possibly a precursor to a future World Parliament and a World Environmental Court..
How to go about creating the WCC is a matter of diplomatic engineering, ideally getting the idea on the agenda of the COP 30 in Belem in Brazil in november 2025, and supported by both the host country, Brazil, which is also a BRICS member and a major Global South country, and by France, which was the host country in 2015 at COP 21 when the Paris Accords were agreed upon, with strong support from Small Islands States and such world leaders as Pope Francis, also Head of State of the Holy See, a State party to the COPs, but carrying a special moral voice.
Stefania Attolini
Title: AI For the Environment: Earth Monitoring Evolutions and Legal Issues
Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming more and more crucial in our daily lives, from providing us with personalized social media feeds, online shopping, or movie recommendations, to even driving us around traffic jams. AI's impact on healthcare, finance, farming, and many other sectors has already been significant, and it is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. There is still a considerable amount of unexplored potential for new AI applications in Earth observation, especially in the area of security and natural disasters prevention.
In 2005, the Union started to develop an independent European Earth observation capacity to deliver services in the environmental fields, then renamed Copernicus.
Copernicus, an operational autonomous, user-driven civil Earth observation system, based on a partnership between the European Union, the European Space Agency and the member States, aims at collecting and processing data about lands, marine environment, climate change, to support the decision-making and acting within the European Union.
The extent and impacts of Copernicus’ services, which are expected to be transversal within the EU policies, have evolved over time, in parallel with the progression of artificial intelligence applications.
AI can be applied to help manage large datasets, find new insights in data, and generate new products and services. Its purpose is to provide a source of information that supports emergency response operations and prevention measures for different types of disasters.
Nevertheless, the legal acts regarding the interaction of AI in the Earth monitoring activities are few and vague.
The final purpose of this paper will be to analyse the use of AI in Earth monitoring, and re-use of the collected data, focusing on ensuring access to environmental knowledge in the most transparent way to all the categories of users, including NGOs and researchers, as well as offer a perspective on the possible legal basis for the policymakers to act.
Nadia Perrone
Title: The EU AI Act: How the European Union promotes the Artificial intelligence development while addressing its ethical and legal implications
The European Union first declared its aim to be “the champion of an approach to AI that benefits people and society as a whole” in 2018 with its Communication on “Artificial Intelligence for Europe”. The European Union underlined the necessity of not being left behind in digital transformation, but at the same time, it made clear that new technologies needed to be based on historical European values and in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. This is why in April 2019 the High-Level Expert Group on AI presented the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, which set forth requirements that AI systems should meet in order to be deemed trustworthy. Specifically, a trustworthy AI needs to be lawful (it should respect all applicable laws and regulations) ethical (consistent with ethical principles and values) and robust (that means to be resilient and secure). In 2020, such guidelines were followed by the so-called ALTAI (Assessment List for Trustworthy AI), that translated the Ethics Guidelines into an accessible and dynamic (self-assessment) checklist to be used by providers and deployers of AI who want to implement the key requirements in practice.
This first attempt to reconcile digital innovation and the respect of fundamental rights has now evolved in the recently adopted European AI Act, the world’s first comprehensive AI law. The Regulation, entered into force in August 2024 and now gradually becoming applicable, aims at enhancing a safe, transparent, traceable, non-discriminatory and environmentally friendly AI. With its adoption, the EU recognises the benefits deriving from the use of AI systems, such as better healthcare, safer and cleaner transport, more efficient manufacturing, and cheaper and more sustainable energy. At the same time, the Regulation considers health and safety risks related to AI systems and the potential violation of fundamental rights, such as the right to non-discrimination, freedom of expression, human dignity, personal data protection and privacy.
The present contribution will briefly present the new AI Act and its implications for the future of European technologies, while also considering its interconnection with other legal frameworks strictly related to the use of artificial intelligence, such as the data protection legislation and the copyright rules. Furthermore, taking into account the extraterritorial effect the AI Act will have, the European Union could now again manifest its “Brussels effect”, potentially influencing the development of a more trustworthy and human centric Artificial Intelligence worldwide.
Gabriele Rogoli
Title: EU Leaders 2030 – The New Paradigm of the Green and Digital Transition
The European Union stands at the crossroads of two historic transformations: the green transition and the digital transition. The “EU Leaders 2030” project proposes an integrated model aimed at positioning Europe as a global leader in sustainable innovation, turning current challenges into opportunities for economic growth, technological autonomy, and social inclusivity. The current global context is marked by an escalating climate crisis and a digital revolution that is radically transforming production and social processes. On one hand, global warming and uncontrolled emissions require immediate action to reduce the environmental impact of economic activities. On the other, digitalization—while offering vast potential for efficiency and innovation—also raises concerns, such as high energy consumption, often reliant on non-renewable sources, and dependency on critical raw materials like lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements. These dynamics highlight the need for an integrated approach that, through innovative policies, reduces environmental impact while
strengthening Europe’s technological sovereignty. The "EU Leaders 2030" paradigm is built on three fundamental pillars:
1. Sustainable Technological Innovation
Investing in solutions that reduce the environmental impact of digital infrastructure is essential. This includes promoting data centers powered by renewable energy and developing energy-efficient algorithms. Additionally, embracing circular economy models—focusing on recycling and reusing materials throughout the technological product lifecycle—can minimize waste and pollution while creating new economic and employment opportunities in high-tech sectors.
2. Technological Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy
Europe faces geopolitical risks due to its heavy reliance on external suppliers for critical components like semiconductors and batteries. To overcome this vulnerability, increased investment in research and development and stronger public-private partnerships are needed. Establishing a domestic production ecosystem for critical technologies will help mitigate supply chain disruptions and secure a competitive advantage on a global scale.
3. Urban Transformation and Social Inclusivity
Smart cities are the laboratories of the urban future, where technology and innovation can optimize energy management, mobility, and quality of life. Investing in sustainable digital infrastructure and education programs to bridge the digital divide is essential for ensuring equitable access to new technologies and preparing the workforce for the challenges of digitalization.
The “EU Leaders 2030” project also proposes concrete policy measures, such as tax incentives for businesses adopting eco-innovative solutions, dedicated funds for clean technology research, and initiatives to strengthen the internal market and cooperation among EU member states. By analyzing best practices and case studies from smart city projects and green infrastructure, the model demonstrates how an integrated vision can translate into a tangible competitive advantage, fostering economic growth, environmental protection, and social cohesion.
Benedetto Rollo
Title: “FEEL FREE TO VENT YOUR FURY HERE”: How corporations use online activism to influence policymaking
The aim of this work is to exhibit and discuss the methods employed by corporations to achieve
policy change through their customers’ online activity, promoting instrumental actions generally
associated with grassroot activism and reaching a large audience through databases at their disposal.
There is extensive evidence that user data collection is a source of income for online platforms, and that this data has been used by advertisers to target segments of audience susceptible to certain kind of messaging. (Zuboff, 2023). Nevertheless, little has been said about instances where a company, using data it had itself collected, reached out to its customers to recruit them for explicit political activity promoting its own objectives. We will focus on Ryanair’s efforts to curb French Air Traffic Control’s employees’ ability to go on strike. Since at least September 2022, the company has called for action from EU representatives requesting changes to French’s minimum service laws and forced arbitration for the ATC Unions. (Ryanair Group, 2022) To help in the task it turned to its passengers, asking them to sign a petition on Change.org called “Protect passengers. Keep EU skies open”. The petition had amassed 1.1 million signatures when it was delivered to the President of the EU Commission. (Ryanair Group, 2023). After the petition was delivered, Ryanair resorted to a new aggressive approach to pressure Ursula von der Leyen into addressing its concerns: sending emails from their marketing account, Ryanair asked them to use the contact form on the EU Commission Website to write directly to the President’s Office, promoting an informal, caustic style in their writing. (Ryanair Group, 2024) This unorthodox call to arms is hardly commercial marketing and more akin to political campaigning. The two methods used to date – petitioning and email flooding – are both associated with citizen activism and might give to this endeavour the semblance of a bottom-up movement, prompting rapid response from its target institution.
The question arises naturally: Ryanair is using its marketing channels, contacting customers whose
data it has collected for entirely different reasons, and then using their dissatisfaction to deploy
them against the European Commission. Should this be allowed?
This development in the company’s approach comes during a time of impactful changes in western countries policies stemming from the U.S.A., one that could result in weaker enterprise regulations, although possibly in a smaller degree than initially anticipated. (Brown, 2025) (Wise, Mackowski, & Hochrun, 2025) (Hay & Chee, 2025).
While Ryanair’s attempt is arguably unsophisticated and transparent, it serves as evidence that it is within a corporation’s capability to target angry customers and shape their political actions
according to its will.
